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EQUITABLE DEFENSES TO ACTIONS AT LAW
UNDER THE MISSOURI CODE*
EARL T. CRAWFORDt
INTRODUCTION
As is well known, New York in 1848 enacted the first code
of civil procedure in which an attempt was made to abolish the
distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity.1 In the
following year, Missouri enacted a similar code2 which was pat-
terned after the New York enactment. 3 Since then many other
states have followed the example set by New York.4
Under the present provisions of the Missouri code of civil
procedure, the plaintiff is permitted to unite in the same petition
several causes of action, whether they are such as were formerly
denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they arise out
of the same transaction or some similar situation, and the de-
fendant is permitted to set forth by answer as many defenses
* This article is a revision of a more detailed treatment of the subject
prepared for graduate credit under Professor Robert Wyness Millar of
Northwestern University Law School, 1935.
t LL.B., Washington University, 1928; LL.M., Northwestern University,
1935. Member of the Missouri and Kansas bars.
1. Hepburn, Historical Development of Code Pleading in America and
England (1897) 92, sec. 88; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1919)
43, sec. 40; Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 18, sec. 7; McCaskill, One Form of
Civil Action (1935) 30 Ill. L. Rev. 415, 419.
2. See Mo. Laws of 1848-49; also Hepburn, op. cit. supra note 1, at 93,
sec. 89, and Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19, sec. 8.
3. New York Laws of 1848, c. 379, sec. 62: "The distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and
suits heretofore existing are abolished; and there shall be in this state
hereafter but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of
private rights and the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denomi-
nated a civil action."
Mo. Laws of 1848-49, 73, sec. 1, now R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 696: "There
shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or pro-
tection of private rights, and redress or prevention of private wrongs,
which shall be denominated a civil action; and the party thereto complain-
ing shall be known as the plaintiff, and the adverse party as the defendant."
Also see Hepburn, op. cit. supra note 1, at 93, sec. 89.
4. Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code (1926) 11 Corn. L. Q. 482.
For status of the various states, see Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 19,
sec. 8, showing that up to 1928 twenty-five states had adopted the new
procedure. Illinois joined this number of states when the legislature
adopted its Civil Practice Act which, however, is far in advance of the
codes of other states for which the "Field Code" served as a model. Ill.
Laws of 1933, 784; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit. 110, sec. 125.
5. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 765, originally R. S. Mo. (1855) 1228, sec. 2.
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and counterclaims as he might have, whether they are such as
were formerly denominated legal or equitable, or both," and new
matter opposing the new matter in the answer can be set up
in the reply.7
This attempted blending of law and equity necessarily created
a number of new legal problems. Their solutions have not been
the same in all jurisdictions which have adopted the new proce-
dure. Some states have retained many of the old distinctions,
while others have to a large degree carried out the apparent
intent of the codes.8 Missouri is among those which have con-
tinued to adhere rather closely to the old distinctionsY This has
been due chiefly to the provision of the state constitution guar-
anteeing that the right of trial by jury "shall remain invio-
late,,,10 which, as construed by the courts, has been held to mean
a jury trial with all of the essentials of such a trial under the
common law.1 Consequently, the courts have been obliged to
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 777, originally Mo. Laws of 1848-49, 80, sec. 8.
See also R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 776, originally Mo. Laws of 1848-49, 80,
sec. 7, as to contents of the answer.
7. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 779, originally Mo. Laws of 1848-49, 80, sec. 9;
and R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 781, originally Mo. Laws of 1848-49, 80, sec. 10.
8. A system of procedure which provides for separate law and equity
dockets, labeling them as such, and in which the pleadings characterize
legal and equitable remedies, when joined in one suit, so that the one
may be distinguished from the other, has been called the "hangover" sys-
tem. Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 46, 66. For a defense of such a
system, see McCaskill, supra note 1.
9. Maguire v. Vice (1855) 20 Mo. 429; Richardson v. Means (1856) 22
Mo. 495; Hunter v. Hunter (1872) 50 Mo. 445; Kelly v. Hurt (1881) 74
Mo. 561; McFarland v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1894) 125 Mo. 253, 28 S. W.
590; State ex rel. I. 0. 0. F. v. Evans (1903) 176 Mo. 310, 75 S. W. 914;
Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Bogie (1927) 317 Mo. 972, 298 S. W. 56; Fowles v.
Bentley (1909) 135 Mo. App. 417, 115 S. W. 1090.
10. Mo. Const. of 1820, art. XIII, sec. 8: " * * * the right of trial byjury shall remain inviolate." Mo. Const. of 1867, art. XVII, sec. 1: "The
right of trial by jury shall be inviolate." Mo. Const. of 1875 (the present
constitution), art. II, sec. 28: "The right of trial by jury, as heretofore
enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." Also see Palmer v. Marshall (Mo. App.
1930) 24 S. IV. (2d) 229.
11. State ex rel. Kansas City & S. E. Ry. v. Slover (1896) 134 Mo. 607,
36 S. W. 50; Hewitt v. Duncan (1931) 226 Mo. App. 254, 43 S. W. (2d)
87; Ex parte Higgins v. Hoctor (1933) 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S. W. (2d) 410;
Barnard Mfg. Co. v. Monett Milling Co. (1899) 79 Mo. App. 153. Also see
Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 52. This view is in consonance with that
expressly enunciated by the act of Congress extending the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court: "The Court may at any time unite the
general rule prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at
law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both; Pro-
vided, however, That in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as
at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitu-
tion shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." (1934) 48 Stat. 1064, c.
651, 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 723b, 723c.
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determine whether the case was one which did or did not require
a jury trial at common law,12 and this necessarily has meant a
retention of the former distinctions as a basis for the deter-
mination of the method of trial.13 In other words, the constitu-
tion recognizes the right of a litigant to have an action at law
tried by a jury and an equitable controversy dealt with as a
proceeding in equity.14 This right is further recognized by two
provisions of the code requiring an issue of fact in an action
for the recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal
property, to be tried by a jury, unless waived or a reference
ordered,25 and requiring that all other issues shall be tried by
the court.16 These provisions have been held to constitute an
attempt to designate what are legal and what are equitable
actionsY.1 But for many purposes, the old distinctions between
actions at law and suits in equity are no longer recognized. Yet,
in the light of the provisions of the statute,' 8 it is apparent that
a complete union of law and equity was not intended.",
Studies have been made of the problems created in the various
states20 and in the federal courts2' by equitable defenses to
actions at law. It is, however, the purpose of this article simply
to consider the problems which have been created by such de-
fenses to legal actions in Missouri under the existing code of
procedure and to note the solutions found for them by the courts.
12. "We need to remember the differences between actions at law and
suits in equity, and of the flexible scope of different types of remedies
before the codes, not because we are reluctant to give up the obsolete
formalities of the past, but in order to know when jury trial is demandable
of right and when not." McCaskill, supra note 1, at 441.
13. McFarland v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1894) 125 Mo. 253, 28 S. W.
590; Lee v. Conran (1908) 213 Mo. 404, 111 S. W. 1151; Withers v. Kansas
City Sub. Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373, 126 S. W. 432. See also, Clark,
supra note 4.
14. Clark, supra note 4, at 497.
15. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 948.
16. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 949.
17. Conran v. Sellew (1859) 28 Mo. 320.
18. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 765, 777, 779, 781.
19. The following comment concerning the New York Code seems equally
applicable here: "The distinctions abolished all deal with outworn and use-
less form, which causes conflict and confusion, instead of harmony and
clarity. There is no more suggestion that actions at law and suits in
equity should disappear than there is that judgments and decrees vanish."
McCaskill, supra note 1, at 420.
20. Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes (1923) 32 Yale L.
J. 645. Clark, supra note 4.
21. MeBaine, Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law in the Federal
Courts (1929) 17 Calif. L. Rev. 591. See also relative to the extension of
the Supreme Court's rule-making power, McCaskill, supra note 1.
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THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE
Undoubtedly, as a preliminary step, it would be well to deter-
mine what an equitable defense is. Pomeroy has answered this
question substantially as follows: "Equitable" is used in its
technical sense as contrasted with "legal"; that is, the right
which gives it its efficacy is an equitable right-a right formerly
recognized and enforced only in courts of equity, and not in
courts of law. "Defense" in its legal connotation is something
which prevents or defeats the recovery of a remedy in an action
or suit, and not something by means of which the party who
interposes it can obtain relief for himself. A "defense" is essen-
tially negative, and not affirmative. It is not to be conceived
of as the means of acquiring positive relief or any remedy, legal
or equitable, for such would constitute a cause of action, not a
defense.22 But this conception, as applied to equitable defenses
in actions at law, has not been universally accepted. A few code
states apparently hold that the defendant cannot avail himself
of facts which entitle him to equitable relief against the plain-
tiff's legal action, simply as a negative defense going to defeat
the claim, but that, in order to interpose such a defense, he must
demand affirmative relief, which, when granted, destroys the
plaintiff's cause of action. 23 Thus, in Indiana, where the plaintiff
brought an action against the maker of a promissory note and
the defendant alleged in his answer that the note was not due
because the due date which appeared was the result of a mis-
take, defendant's plea was held to constitute no defense since
he did not ask for a reformation or affirmative relief of some
nature.24 This view is analogous to the common law, under which
a matter of equitable cognizance was not a defense to an action
at law but could be made the basis of an affirmative bill in
equity, for example, to reform, cancel, or rescind an agreement.
Pomeroy criticizes this construction of the code. According to
his view, a defense is a negative resistance or an obstacle which
prevents a recovery, whether it be legal or equitable, and if every
equitable defense in order to be available must consist in an
affirmative recovery of specific relief against the plaintiff, for
the same reasons and with the same force, it might be said that
22. Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5th ed. 1929) 46, sec. 27.
23. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 48, sec. 29.
24. Scott v. Norris (1892) 6 Ind. App. 102, 32 N. E. 332, rehearing den.
(1893) 33 N. E. 227.
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every legal defense, in order to be available, must consist of a
counterclaim. And in further support of his view, he mentions
the fact that the sections of the statutes which prescribe the
form and content of the answer, enumerate counterclaims as
well as legal and equitable defenses, thereby expressly distin-
guishing between the equitable defense as such and the recovery
of affirmative equitable relief.25 The construction followed by
Missouri, and the correct one according to Pomeroy,
* * * is that whenever equity confers a right, and the right
avails to defeat a legal cause of action,-that is, shows that
the plaintiff ought not to recover in his legal action-then
the facts from which such right arises may be set up as an
equitable defence in bar.2
6
In other words, the defendant should be able to set up as a de-
fense in bar any matter which formerly a court of equity would
have permitted him to use as the basis of an original proceeding
in equity for obtaining relief against a legal demand. From the
foregoing, therefore, it would seem that historically the matter
should be considered as a counterclaim, but analytically and
practically it should be considered as a defense. 27
While Missouri adheres to the view that all matters formerly
cognizable in courts of equity are now proper defenses in bar
to actions at law,2 8 the counterclaim is used whenever the de-
fendant desires affirmative relief rather than simply to defeat
the plaintiff's action. 29 It is to be noted, however, that the Mis-
souri courts do not generally speak of this method of obtaining
equitable relief as a counterclaim. Instead it is usually desig-
nated as the setting up of an equitable defense coupled with a
prayer for affirmative equitable relief, 0 although occasionally it
is referred to as a counterclaim, 1 a cross-petition, 2 a cross-bill,
25. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 48, see. 29. Clark & Surbeck,
The Pleading of Counterclaims (1927) 37 Yale L. 3. 300, 303.
26. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 50, sec. 30. Cook, op. cit. supra
note 20. See also Sachleben v. Heintze (1893) 117 Mo. 520, 24 S. W. 54;
Kostuba v. Miller (1897) 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W. 946.
27. Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 429, sec. 96.
28. See Clark, supra note 4, at 497. But there are some exceptions to
this general statement, as will hereinafter appear.
29. See discussion infra regarding defenses in bar and equitable counter-
claims. Also see Seiberling, Miller & Co. v. Tipton (1893) 113 Mo. 373, 21
S. W. 4.
30. See infra, page 67.
31. Withers v. Kansas City Sub. Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373, 126 S. W.
432; Dahlberg v. Fisse (1931) 328 Mo. 213, 40 S. W. (2d) 606.
32. Keltner v. Threlkel (1927) 316 Mo. 609, 291 S. W. 462.
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or a cross-action.3 3 When analyzed in comparison with the
counterclaim of those states which do not recognize an equitable
defense to an action at law unless set up as a counterclaim, the
Missouri equitable defense coupled with a prayer for affirmative
relief appears to be the same as the counterclaim. Each consti-
tutes a complete case in itself and, under the old as well as the
new system, would have entitled the defendant to maintain an
independent suit in equity.
In a few states, cross-petitions or cross-complaints are ex-
pressly recognized by the codes in addition to counterclaims ;34
but the Missouri code recognizes the counterclaims alone.
THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE IN BAR
The general rule, now well established in Missouri, is that the
setting up of an equitable defense, along with a general denial
or an affirmative legal defense, in the answer to an action at
law leaves the case one at law.35 In other words, the issue created
by the equitable defense in bar in no manner affects the trial
of the case, or, in the language employed by the courts, the
pleading of an equitable defense does not convert an action at
law into one in equity.-6 This was the result where the de-
fendant in an ejectment action set up in his answer a general
denial and the equitable defen'se that the plaintiff held the land
involved by a resulting trust for the defendant but sought no
affirmative equitable relief.3 7 The defense pleaded, were it sus-
33. Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899) 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515.
34. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 56, sec. 35.
35. Kerstner v. Vorweg (1895) 130 Mo. 196, 32 S. W. 298; Toler v.
Edwards (1913) 249 Mo. 152, 155 S. W. 26.
36. Carter v. Prior (1883) 78 Mo. 222; Kerstuer v. Vorweg (1895) 130
Mo. 196, 32 S. W. 298; Kostuba v. Miller (1897) 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W.
946; Ridgeway v. Herbert (1899) 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W. 1040; Hall v. Small.
(1903) 178 Mo. 629, 77 S. W. 733; Kessner v. Phillips (1905) 189 Mo.
515, 88 S. W. 66, 107 Am. St. Rep. 368; Brooks v. Gaffin (1905) 192
Mo. 228, 90 S. W. 808; Toler v. Edwards (1913) 249 Mo. 152, 155
S. W. 26; Bell v. George (1918) 275 Mo. 17, 204 S. W. 516; Newbrough
v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202 S. W. 547; Koehler v. Rowland (1918) 275
Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217; Citizens' Trust Co. v. Going (1921) 288 Mo.
805, 232 S. W. 996; Bush v. Stumpe (Mo. 1920) 222 S. W. 1009; Cullen v.
Johnson (1930) 325 Mo. 253, 29 S. W. (2d) 39; Ebbs v. Neff (1930) 325
Mo. 1182, 30 S. W. (2d) 616; Wolf v. Schaeffer (1877) 4 Mo. App. 367;
also see same (1880) 6 Mo. App. 589; (1881) 74 Mo. 154; Hodges v. Black
(1880) 8 Mo. App. 389, aff'd (1882) 76 Mo. 537; Bank of Neelyville v.
Lee (1916) 193 Mo. App. 537, 182 S. W. 1016.
37. Kessner v. Phillips (1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66, 107 Am. St.
Rep. 368.
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tained, would simply defeat the action at law;38 and the case
would end as though the defendant had merely set up a legal
defense. It would operate as a bar to the plaintiff's claim in
the same manner that a legal defense would. Indeed, it has been
suggested that under the construction of the code which permits
equitable defenses to be pleaded in bar, such defenses serve as
legal defenses.39 And the issue raised by the equitable defense in
bar is tried by the jury along with, and in the same manner as,
the legal issues in the same suit. 0
But, if the defendant in his answer admits the plaintiff's cause
of action and at the same time sets up an equitable defense and
nothing more, the whole proceeding is converted into a case in
equity.41 The reason for this is obvious. By such conduct the
defendant concedes the plaintiff's right to recover on his legal
action, unless the equitable defense prevails. Consequently, only
an equitable matter is presented for determination or adjudica-
tion. There are no legal issues involved. Nor is it necessary that
the defendant, having admitted plaintiff's prima facie legal case,
do anything except set up an equitable defense; that is, it does
not seem necessary for him to seek any affirmative equitable
relief under these circumstances in order to convert the case into
one in equity.
Furthermore, if the defendant has an equitable defense, he
must set it up either in bar or as the basis for affirmative re-
lief.42 He cannot later make it the ground for an independent
suit in equity against a former plaintiff, since equitable defenses
now occupy the same status as legal defenses.43
Inasmuch as the pleading of an equitable defense in bar along
with a general denial or an affirmative legal defense does not
convert the action into one in equity but leaves it a case at law,
either party is entitled to have the whole case tried before a
jury.44 The equitable as well as the legal issues in the case are
38. Brooks v. Gaffm (1905) 192 Mo. 228, 90 S. W. 808.
39. Hinton, supra note 20, at 717, 719, 720; Cook, supra note 20, at 650,
referring to the Hinton comment.
40. See cases cited supra, note 36; also infra, note 45.
41. Allen v. Logan (1888) 96 Mo. 591, 10 S. W. 149; Ridgeway v.
Herbert (1899) 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W. 1040; Lewis v. Rhodes (1899) 150
Mo. 498, 52 S. W. 11.
42. See infra page 71, as to the necessity of setting up the equitable
counterclaim.
43. See infra page 71, for authorities and reasoning also applicable here.
44. Moline Plow Co. v. Hartman (1884) 84 Mo. 610; Estes v. Fry (1888)
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for the jury, and the entire case is tried in the same manner as
if all the issues were legal issues. As a result, a denial of the
right to have the whole case tried before a jury constitutes re-
versible error.45 And this view seems to be based upon the
premise that the equitable defense goes only to defeat or bar
the claim of the plaintiff and there is no demand or need for the
court to exercise any of the powers of a court of equity. The
issue is simply: should the plaintiff recover? But where the de-
fendant admits the plaintiff's cause of action at law and sets up
purely an equitable defense, the case is tried by the court as a
proceeding in equity.46 In this situation, the pleadings raise
only an equitable issue; it is an equitable controversy.
THE EQUITABLE DEFENSE COUPLED WITH A PRAYER FOR
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF, OR THE EQUITABLE COUNTERCLAIM
If the answer of the defendant to plaintiff's action at law, in
addition to the setting up of an equitable defense, also prays
for affirmative equitable relief, the case is converted from one
at law into a proceeding in equity;47 that is, all the issues in
94 Mo. 226, 6 S. W. 660; Hall v. Small (1903) 178 Mo. 629, 77 S. W. 733;
Lee v. Conran (1908) 213 Mo. 404, 111 S. W. 1151; Kansas City v. Smith
(1911) 238 Mo. 323, 141 S. W. 1103; Newbrough v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202
S. W. 547; Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Mo. App. 1915)
178 S. W. 246, and for transfer to the Supreme Court, see (1919) 277 Mo.
399, 210 S. W. 37.
45. Moline Plow Co. v. Hartman (1884) 84 Mo. 610; Hubbard v. Slavens
(1909) 218 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104; Newbrough v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202
S. W. 547; Chilton v. Chilton (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 457.
46. Schuster v. Schuster (1887) 93 Mo. 438, 6 S. W. 259; O'Day v. Conn
(1895) 131 Mo. 321, 32 S. W. 1109.
47. McCollum v. Boughton (1896) 132 Mo. 601, 30 S. W. 1028, 35 L. R.
A. 480; Swon v. Stevens (1908) 143 Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270; Dunn v. McCoy
(1894) 150 Mo. 548, 52 S. W. 21; Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan (1903) 175
Mo. 32, 74 S. W. 1007; Bouton v. Pippin (1905) 192 Mo. 469, 91 S. W. 149;
Pitts v. Pitts (1907) 201 Mo. 356, 100 S. W. 1047; Hubbard v. Slavens
(1909) 218 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104; Waters v. Hubbard (Mo. 1909) 117
S. W. 1112; Withers v. Kansas City Sub. Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373,
126 S. W. 432; Betzler & Clark v. James (1910) 227 Mo. 375, 126 S. W.
1007; Colburn v. Krenning (Mo. 1920) 220 S. W. 934; Jacobs v. Waldron
(1927) 317 Mo. 1133, 298 S. W. 773; Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten
(1897) 68 Mo. App. 137; Strong v. Gordon (1920) 203 Mo. App. 470,
221 S. W. 770; Roach v. Landis (Mo. App. 1927) 1 S. W. (2d) 203; Cohen
v. Daily (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 199. But where plaintiff's action
is for the recovery of money or specific property, by virtue of statute, R. S.
Mo. (1929) sec. 948, there seems to be some confusion in the authorities.
Some hold that the prayer for the affirmative relief does not convert the
action into an equitable proceeding. Smith v. St. Louis Beef Canning Co.
(1884) 14 Mo. App. 522, and cases there cited. See also Rand, McNally &
Co. v. Wickham (1894) 60 Mo. App. 44; and West v. West (Mo. App. 1937)
110 S. W. (2d) 398, where plaintiff brought an action for waste and asked
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the case, both legal and equitable, are for the chancellor . 8 This
is illustrated by Swon v. Stevens, 49 a typical case, where the
plaintiff brought an action in ejectment. The defendant in his
answer claimed that the sale to the plaintiff under a deed of
trust was invalid because it was made before the note had be-
come due, and asked the court to declare the deed of trust null
and void and to enter a decree cancelling the trustee's deed. As
previously stated, this type of an answer may be regarded as a
counterclaim. It tends not only to defeat the plaintiff's action"'
but also to secure affirmative equitable relief for the defendant.
Where such relief is sought, there is an appeal to the court to
exercise its power as a court of equity. In other words, to use
the language of the courts, if the issues joined entitled the
parties to an ordinary judgment at law, then the case remains
a case at law; but, if the issues tendered are equitable in their
nature and call for affirmative equitable relief, the cause is con-
verted into a suit in equity. 2 Of course, the facts pleaded must
entitle the defendant to the affirmative relief sought ;53 and such
that defendant be enjoined from committing further waste. Others hold
that the action is converted. Freeman v. Wilkerson (1872) 50 Mo. 554;
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan (1903) 175 Mo. 32, 74 S. W. 1007; Hughes v.
Community Bank of Dawn (1934) 336 Mo. 305; 78 S. W. (2d) 98; Rienker
v. Wesche (Mo. 1938) 117 S. W. (2d) 334; Strong v. Gordon (1920) 203
Mo. App. 470, 221 S. W. 770. The law today is undoubtedly represented
by these last named cases. Some of the early cases also held that it was
only where matters of law and equity are so blended that the case could
not properly be tried by a jury, and equity alone could afford relief, that
a conversion took place. Kortjohn v. Seimers (1888) 29 Mo. App. 271;
Rand, McNally & Co. v. Wickham (1894) 60 Mo. App. 44; Grayson v.
Weddle (1883) 80 Mo. 39. Or where the matter of defense is of purely
equitable cognizance. Allen v. Logan (1888) 96 Mo. 591, 10 S. W. 149;
Rand, McNally & Co. v. Wickham (1894) 60 Mo. App. 44. But the law now
is undoubtedly as expressed in the text above.
48. But, even though the answer seeks affirmative relief, its withdrawal
before trial leaves the case one at law. Marsden v. Nipp (1930) 325 Mo.
822, 30 S. W. (2d) 77.
49. (1908) 143 Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270.
50. See supra, page 64.
51. Apparently, a cross-action will not convert a case into a suit in
equity, unless the matters pleaded by the defendant will destroy plaintiff's
case or show that he never had a valid cause of action. Hughes v. Com-
munity Bank of Dawn (1934) 336 Mo. 305, 78 S. W. (2d) 98.
52. Newbrough v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202 S. W. 547; Rains v. Moulder
(1936) 338 Mo. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 81. Also see Federal Land Bank v.
McColgan (1933) 332 Mo. 860, 59 S. W. (2d) 1052; New Harmony Lodge
v. Kansas City Ft. S. & M. R. R. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 407, 74 S. W. 5.
53. Hall v. Small (1903) 178 Mo. 620, 77 S. W. 733; Kessner v. Phillips
(1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66, 107 Am. St. Rep. 368; Pitts v. Pitts
(1907) 201 Mo. 356, 100 S. W. 1047; Hubbard v. Slavens (1909) 218 Mo.
598, 117 S. W. 1104; Waters v. Hubbard (Mo. 1909) 117 S. W. 1112; Arm-
bruster v. Armbruster (1930) 326 Mo. 5, 31 S. W. (2d) 28, 77 A. L. R.
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relief must be necessary for his defense, or such as can only be
granted by a court of equity. There must be a prayer for the
relief desired, and the prayer must be based on the defense set
up in the answer. 6 In Boehme v. Roth57 the court held that, in
determining whether the answer calls for equitable relief, it
would consider the answer as a whole, exclusive of the prayer.
In this case, the plaintiff had instituted an action in replevin
against the defendant, who answered and prayed "the court to
protect the interest of the defendant and to adjudge a disaffirm-
ance of the contract herein" and for the return of the property
involved. The court declared that the demand for relief is no
part of the cause of action as it does not classify the action and
may be changed without changing the cause of action.58
782; Babcock v. Rieger (1933) 332 Mo. 528, 58 S. W. (2d) 722; Williams v.
Walker (1933) 333 Mo. 322, 62 S. W. (2d) 840; Rains v. Moulder (1936)
338 Mo. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 81; Rand, McNally & Co. v. Wickham (1894)
60 Mo. App. 44; Bank of Neelyville v. Lee (1916) 193 Mo. App. 537, 182
S. W. 1016; Berryman v. Maryland Motor Car Ins. Co. (1918) 199 Mo.
App. 503, 204 S. W. 738. For a general discussion regarding the allega-
tions of the counterclaim, see Clark & Surbeck, supra note 25, at 304-305.
54. Harris v. Vinyard (1868) 42 Mo. 568; Withers v. Kansas City Sub.
Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373, 126 S. W. 432; Colburn v. Krenning (Mo.
1920) 220 S. W. 934; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel (1931) 328 Mo. 876,
42 S. W. (2d) 584; Williams v. Walker (1933) 333 Mo. 322, 62 S. W. (2d)
840; Thompson v. National Bank of Commerce (1908) 132 Mo. App. 225,
110 S. W. 681; Stalter v. Stalter (1910) 151 Mo. App. 66, 131 S. W. 747;
Long v. Montgomery (Mo. App. 1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 206. In this respect,
it is of interest to note the holding where the action is based on an insur-
ance policy, after the insured's death, and the defendant sets up fraud and
misrepresentation and asks the court to decree the policy null and void.
Since under the statute, R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5732, if the alleged fraud
and misrepresentation did not actually contribute to the insured's death,
no possible harm could result to the defendant in the future, the court,
by being asked to annul the policy, is called upon to do a useless thing.
See Schuermann v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. (1907) 165 Mo. 641, 65 S. W.
723; Kern v. Supreme Council (1902) 167 Mo. 471, 67 S. W. 252; Wollums
v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n (1931) 226 Mo. App. 647,
46 S. W. (2d) 259.
55. Citizens Trust Co. v. Going (1921) 288 Mo. 505, 232 S. W. 996;
Cullen v. Johnson (1930) 325 Mo. 253, 29 S. W. (2d) 39. Rains v. Moulder
(1936) 338 Mo. 275, 90 S. W. (2d) 81.
56. Toler v. Edwards (1913) 249 Mo. 152, 155 S. W. 26; Citizens' Trust
Co. v. Going (1921) 288 Mo. 505, 232 S. W. 996; Jacobs v. Waldron (1927)
317 Mo. 1133, 298 S. W. 773; Wolf v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1925) 219
Mo. App. 307, 269 S. W. 701.
57. (Mo. App. 1926) 280 S. W. 730. See also Hauser v. Murray (1914)
256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W. 376; New Harmony Lodge v. Kansas City Ft. S. &
M. R. R. (1903) 100 Mo. App. 407, 74 S. W. 5; State ex rel. Jackly v.
Taylor (1922) 210 Mo. App. 195, 242 S. W. 997; Wollums v. Mutual Bene-
fit Health & Accident Ass'n (1931) 226 Mo. App. 647, 46 S. W. (2d) 259.
58. Boehme v. Roth (Mo. App. 1926) 280 S. W. 730. See also Davidson
v. Gould (Mo. App. 1916) 187 S. W. 591, which holds that the equitable
counterclaim must satisfy all the requirements of a good bill in equity.
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The nature of the equitable counterclaim, or the so-called
crossbill, is revealed by those cases where the plaintiff.dismisses
his case after the defendant has filed an answer setting up an
equitable defense and asking for affirmative equitable relief.
The dismissal of the plaintiff's suit does not carry the defen-
dant's counterclaim out of court, where the counterclaim makes
a case entitling him to equitable relief against the plaintiff touch-
ing the subject matter of the plaintiff's case. 9
This rule is based upon the statutory provision which provides
that the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit shall not operate as a
dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim." Of course it is ap-
parent from this that the mere setting up of an equitable defense
in bar, without seeking affirmative relief, will not prevent de-
fendant's answer from being carried out of court by plaintiff's
dismissal of his own cause of action. And the foregoing indi-
cates that the counterclaim is more than a mere defense, as it
constitutes a complete cause of action in itself, and embodies
matter which would have supported an independent proceeding
in equity either prior to or after the enactment of the code.
As a general proposition, and as already pointed out, 1 affirma-
tive equitable relief cannot be granted to a defendant on his
answer by way of defense.6 2 To obtain such relief, resort must
be had to the counterclaim-an equitable defense coupled with
a prayer for affirmative reliefA3 Unless the defendant asks for
such relief, no reason apparently exists for granting it to him.
But Hauser v. Murray-4 indicates that there may be an exception
to the general rule whenever the defendant invokes an equitable
defense to defeat a legal action, which for "all practical pur-
poses" amounts to a request for affirmative relief. In Hauser v.
59. Lewis v. Rhodes (1899) 150 Mo. 498, 52 S. W. 11; Fulton v. Fisher(1912) 239 Mo. 116, 143 S. W. 438; Hodges v. Black (1880) 8 Mo. App.
389, aff'd (1882) 76 Mo. 537; Roach v. Landis (Mo. App. 1927) 1 S. W.(2d) 203; Dezino v. Drozda Realty Co. (Mo. App. 1929) 13 S. W. (2d)
659. This last named case holds that the same is true whether plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses his suit or whether the court deems it necessary to
dismiss it. Also see Clark Real Estate Co. v. Old Trails Inv. Co. (1934)
835 Mo. 1237,-76 S. W. (2d) 388.
60. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 849, originally R. S. Mo. (1889) sec. 8172.
61. See supra, page 69.
62. Harris v. Vinyard (1868) 42 Mo. 568; State ex rel. Townshend v.
Meagher (1869) 42 Mo. 356, 100 Am. Dec. 298.
63. See supra, page 67.
64. (1914) 256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W. 376.
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Murray"5 the plaintiffs brought the statutory action to quiet title
to certain real estate. The defendants, who were husband and
wife, filed an answer setting up, along with several legal de-
fenses, two equitable defenses: (1) estoppel in pais, and (2)
that the grantor of the plaintiffs had purchased the land in ques-
tion with money held by him in trust, that the beneficiary of
such trust was now dead, and that the defendant (wife) was
the sole heir and entitled to the real estate. No affirmative equi-
table relief was requested by either of the defendants, but the
court decreed title to a portion of the land to one of them, the
wife. By the decision in this case, the formal distinction between
an equitable defense in bar and an equitable counterclaim is prac-
tically destroyed. The matter of a jury trial is made to depend
upon whether the answer in substance sought affirmative equi-
table relief, and not upon whether the answer in form sought
affirmative equitable relief.
If a defendant has an equitable defense, he is obliged to set
it up in his answer either in bar or as the basis for affirmative
relief. He can avail himself of the defense only in this manner;
he cannot afterwards make it the ground for an independent
suit in equity against a former plaintiff. This rule was estab-
lished in Kelley v. Hurt.8 In that case the plaintiff brought an
action against the defendant to set aside a sheriff's deed, alleg-
ing that the property included in the deed had been unnecessarily
sold in Massachusetts in order to pay a judgment debt, and that
as a result of such a sale the property was sacrificed. The plain-
tiff was the defendant in a former action in ejectment brought
by the purchaser, the present defendant, but did not set up the
65. (1914) 256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W. 376. Also see Tapley v. Herman(1902) 95 Mo. App. 537, 69 S. W. 482; and States ex rel. Jackly v. Taylor
(1922) 210 Mo. App. 195, 242 S. W. 997.
66. (1881) 74 Mo. 561. See also Preston v. Rickets (1886) 91 Mo. 320,
2 S. W. 793, where, in an ejectment suit, the defendant set up an equitable
defense, and the cause was tried, and judgment rendered in favor of the
plaintiff. The equitable defense was held res judicata, and the defendant
could not thereafter recover by a proceeding to establish his equitable title
passed upon in the former suit as a defense. But in some states, it has
been held that while the defendant may set up an equitable defense in a
legal action, he is not obliged to do so, particularly where it is not purely
defensive but calls for affirmative relief. If a defendant has such a defense
and omits to set it up in defense, and the plaintiff prevails, "the defendant
is not precluded from asserting his equity in a separate action." Ayres v.
Bensley (1867) 32 Cal. 620, 626. The holding, as indicated in this case,
is based upon the construction of the act-that the defendant may set up
such a defense at his option.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/1
72 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25
matter constituting the foundation of his present action as an
equitable defense in the ejectment suit. It was held that he
could not maintain his action to set the deed aside. In its opin-
ion, the court stated that, before equitable defenses were cogni-
zable at law, a party who had and was aware of his defense at
law and failed to plead the same, could not afterwards success-
fully apply to a court of chancery for relief. It further stated
that, in consequence of the change effected by the code, what was
formerly denominated an equitable defense is just as available
and just as potent in precluding recovery against the party
pleading it as was a legal defense in a court of common law,
and that under the new order the same doctrine, as applied to
legal defenses in like circumstances at common law, should be
applied to equitable defenses. A consideration of the purpose of
the code and especially the expressed intent that all controversies
respecting the matter involved in litigation should be determined
in one action makes the correctness of this decision evident.
Whenever a case is converted into a proceeding in equity
through the interposition of an equitable counterclaim in the
manner we have already indicated,67 the case is tried by the
court sitting as a chancellor,68 and neither party is entitled to a
jury trial.69 The case is tried like an original action in equity.
The rule seems to be definitely established that the orderly way
to try the case is to first dispose of the issues raised by the
equitable counterclaim and then to try the legal action stated
in the petition.70 This rule is based upon the part played by the
counterclaim, for the plaintiff cannot recover upon the cause of
action stated in his petition if the equities set up by the de-
fendant are established.71 It is obvious, therefore, that a dis-
67. See cases cited supra, note 47.
68. Moline Plow Co. v. Hartman (1884) 84 Mo. 610; Estes v. Fry (1888)
94 Mo. 266, 6 S. W. 660; Lee v. Conran (1908) 213 Mo. 404, 111 S. W.
1151; Kansas City v. Smith (1911) 238 Mo. 323, 141 S. W. 1103; Nev-
brough v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202 S. W. 547; Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v.
Phoenix Assur. Co. (Mo. App. 1915) 178 S. W. 246; (1919) 277 Mo. 399,
210 S. W. 37.
69. Moline Plow Co. v. Hartman (1884) 84 Mo. 610; Hubbard v. Slavens(1909) 218 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104; Newbrough v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202
S. W. 547; Chilton v. Chilton (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 457.
70. Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899) 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515; Keltner v.
Threlkel (1927) 316 Mo. 609, 291 S. W. 462; Dahlberg v. Fisse (1931)
328 Mo. 213, 40 S. W. (2d) 606.
71. Allen v. Logan (1888) 96 Mo. 591, 10 S. W. 149; Keltner v. Threlkel
(1927) 316 Mo. 609, 291 S. W. 462.
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posal of the issues raised by the equitable counterclaim will gen-
erally (if found in favor of the defendant) dispose of the whole
case and make unnecessary a trial of the legal issues. Conse-
quently, in many cases, this order of trial, as well as being the
logical method, results in a saving of time.
As has previously been stated,7 2 in those cases where the de-
fendant sets up in his answer a legal defense and also an equi-
table defense coupled with a prayer for affirmative equitable
relief, all the issues are to be tried by the court, whether they
are legal or equitable. By virtue of statute,73 on the application
of either party, the court may in its discretion74 direct separate
trials, if it be of the opinion that all or any issues in a case
should be tried separately by the court or jury. Under the statu-
tory authorization, the legal issues in the case can be submitted
to the jury; but it is apparent from the language of the statute
that neither party can as a matter of right demand a trial by
jury of such issues. This is the logical, if not the only, interpre-
tation of the enactment. There is no real reason why the action
should, as a matter of right, be split up into legal and equitable
issues and the former submitted to a jury, since the court is
vested with power to award complete relief 75 as a court of equity
under the old order, even to the extent of adjudicating matters
of law.76 But it may be urged 'against this view that to permit
the court to try the legal issues would deprive the parties of
their constitutional right to a trial by jury. This contention,
however, is without merit. Since the case has been converted
into a proceeding in equity, no jury can be demanded. The case
72. See supra, note 47.
73. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 951: "Where there are several causes of action
united in a petition, or where there are several issues, and the court shall
be of the opinion that all or any of them should be tried separately by the
court or jury, it may, on the application of either party, direct separate
trials, which may be had at the same or at different terms of the court, as
circumstances may require. In all cases where there are separate causes
of action united as aforesaid, the court shall award separate costs against
the unsuccessful party, unless for good cause it shall otherwise order. The
judgment upon each separate finding shall await the trial of all the issues."
74. Osmak v. American Car & Foundry Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 159, 40
S. W. (2d) 714. Also see: Estes v. Fry (1888) 94 Mo. 266, 6 S. W. 660,
and McFarland v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1894) 125 Mo. 253, 28 S. W. 590.
75. Growney v. O'Donnell (1917) 272 Mo. 167, 198 S. W. 863.
76. Miller v. St. Louis & K. C. Ry. (1901) 162 Mo. 424, 63 S. W. 85;
Waddle v. Frazier (1912) 245 Mo. 391, 151 S. W. 87, noting also cases
there cited. Also see Grinnell Co. v. Farm Home Savings & Loan Ass'n
(Mo. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 409.
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is one in equity, and the court has complete power to dispose
of all the issues in the pending litigation.77
While all the decisions do not clearly hold in express language
that, where the proceeding has become one in equity through the
interposition of an equitable counterclaim, the parties are not
entitled to have the legal issues submitted to a jury as a matter
of right, it is quite obvious from the language used that such
is the law. They are uniform in holding that the action, 8 the
case 7 9 the whole case,80 the suit,81 or the cause82 is converted
into a suit or proceeding in equity, whether an equitable counter-
claim is set up with a general denial or with an affirmative legal
defense. None of the decisions hold that only a part of the
cause of action is converted, or that only the equitable issues
are for the court. This being true, the court has the power to
dispose of the entire case as in any other proceeding in equity.
Whether the legal issues shall be submitted to a jury is a mat-
ter resting solely in the discretion of the court, either by virtue
of statute or of its general power as a court of equity to call
a jury to its aid.83 And there is no doubt as to the power of
the court to call a jury to its aid where the action has been con-
verted from one at law into one in equity,8 4 but the jury's find-
ings are not binding on the court but are merely advisory as in
any other equitable proceeding. 5 The court may abide by them
77. Barnard v. Keathley (1910) 230 Mo. 209, 130 S. W. 306; Growney v.
O'Donnell (1917) 272 Mo. 167, 198 S. W. 863.
78. McCollum v. Boughton (1896) 132 Mo. 601, 30 S. W. 1028, 35 A. L.
R. 480; Swon v. Stevens (1908) 143 Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270; Toler v. Ed-
wards (1913) 249 Mo. 152, 155 S. W. 26; Schneider v. Schneider (1920)
284 Mo. 314, 224 S. W. 1; Seaboard Nat'l Bank v. Woesten (1897) 68 Mo.
App. 137; Lawson v. Spencer (1899) 81 Mo. App. 169; Bank of Neely-
vile v. Lee (1916) 193 Mo. App. 537, 182 S. W. 1016.
79. Lincoln Trust Co. v. Nathan (1903) 175 Mo. 32, 74 S. W. 1007;
Kessner v. Phillips (1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66, 107 Am. St. Rep.
368; Shaffer v. Detie (1905) 191 Mo. 377, 90 S. W. 131; Brooks v. Gaffin(1905) 192 Mo. 228, 90 S. W. 808.
80. Lewis v. Rhodes (1899) 150 Mo. 498, 52 S. W. 11; Withers v. Kansas
City Sub. Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373, 126 S. W. 432.
81. Koehler v. Rowland (1918) 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217.
82. Pitts v. Pitts (1907) 201 Mo. 356, 100 S. W. 1047; Hubbard v.
Slavens (1909) 128 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104; Waters v. Hubbard (Mo.
1909) 117 S. W. 1112; Betzler & Clark v. James (1910) 227 Mo. 375, 126
S. W. 1007.
83. Estes v. Fry (1888) 94 Mo. 266, 6 S. W. 660.
84. Bouton v. Pippin (1905) 192 Mo. 469, 91 S. W. 141; Pitts v. Pitts(1907) 201 Mo. 356, 100 S. W. 1047; also see Northrip v. Burge (1914)
255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W. 584.
85. See cases cited supra, note 84.
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or ignore them entirely. This is a further indication that the
conversion is complete, and the whole case is for the court.
The case of Short v. Kidt 6 involved an action in ejectment,
wherein the defendant set up a general denial, a plea of adverse
possession under the ten year statute of limitations, and facts
showing a resulting trust in defendant's favor. Affirmative
equitable relief was sought through a prayer that the plaintiff
be divested of the title to the land in question and that it be
vested in the defendant. The issue regarding the resulting trust
was tried by the court, and the remaining issues were continued
and submitted to a jury at the next term of court. It was held
that, even though the court had passed on the equitable defense
at one term of court and at the next term had submitted the
legal issues to the jury, the case remained one in equity. This
decision clearly indicates that the whole case is converted
through the interposition of an equitable counterclaim.
EQUITABLE MATTERS IN THE REPLY
In his reply the plaintiff may set up new matter in opposition
to the new matter contained in the defendant's answer. 7 Con-
sequently, the reply may set up equitable matter in bar of the
defense or an equitable counterclaim to an affirmative defense
in the answer. The same legal principles which apply to equi-
table defenses or equitable counterclaims in the answer are also
applicable here,88 but formerly there was one important excep-
tion. This exception denied the plaintiff the right to set up
fraud in the procurement of a release, which rendered it void-
able but not void,89 in his reply to defendant's answer pleading
86. (Mo. 1917) 197 S. W. 64.
87. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 779: "And where the answer contains new
matter, the plaintiff shall reply to such new matter within such time as
the court by rule or otherwise shall require, denying generally or specifically
the allegations controverted by him, or any knowledge or information there-
of, sufficient to form a belief, and he may allege in ordinary and concise
language and without repetition, any new matter not inconsistent with the
petition, constituting a defense to the new matter in the answer." For
original enactment, see Mo. Laws of 1848-9, 80, sec. 9.
88. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 781: "The reply shall be governed by the rules
prescribed in relation to answers." For original enactment see, Mo. Laws
of 1848-9, 80, sec. 10. See also Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899) 153 Mo. 172, 54
S. W. 515.
89. Fraud in the factum is frequently said to render a release void, and
fraud in the inducement to render it voidable. The two terms are used
here in this sense. McCoy v. McMahon Construction Co. (Mo. 1919) 216
S. W. 770; Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. (1925)
309 Mo. 638, 274 S. W. 815, and cases cited; George v. Tate (1880) 102
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such release as a bar to plaintiff's action, but required him to
resort to a court of equity in order to have the release set aside
in a proceeding instituted for that express purpose. 0 The chief
objection to raising the question of fraud in the reply appeared
to be that such a procedure permitted questions of fraud to be
tried by a jury instead of by a chancellor and that the recession
of a release could thus be obtained upon evidence which would
have been insufficient in a court of equity. 1 Since fraud, how-
ever, could be set up as a defense in bar in an answer to an
action upon a voidable agreement, 92 the same should have been
equally permissible by reply. The same objection is applicable
in either instance. In order to remedy the situation, however,
a statute was enacted under which the plaintiff was expressly
authorized to allege in the reply any facts showing, or tending
to show, that the release was fraudulently or wrongfully pro-
cured from the plaintiff, and the issues thus raised submitted
to the jury for determination.91 With the enactment of this pro-
vision, the same rule now applies to the reply as to the answer.9
THE APPEAL
Whenever a case at law is converted into a proceeding in
equity by the interposition of an equitable defense and a prayer
U. S. 564. See infra, page 80, for further discussion regarding "voidable"
and "void."
90. McFarland v. Missouri Pac. R. R. (1894) 125 Mo. 253, 28 S. W.
590; Homuth v. Metropolitan St. Ry. (1895) 129 Mo. 629, 31 S. W. 903;
Och v. Missouri K. & T. Ry. (1895) 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962; Hancock v.
Blackwell (1897) 139 Mo. 440, 41 S. W. '205; Althoff v. St. Louis Transit
Co. (1907) 204 Mo. 166, 102 S. W. 642.
91. Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co. (1894) 46 Mo. App. 79, 27 S. W.
648.
92. See infra, note 120.
93. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 782: "Whenever a release, composition, settle-
ment, or other discharge of the cause of action sued on shall be set up
or pleaded in the answer in bar to plaintiff's cause of action sued on, it
shall be permissible in the reply to allege any facts showing or tending to
show that said release, composition, settlement or other discharge was
fraudulently or wrongfully procured from the plaintiff, and the issue or
issues thus raised shall be submitted with all the other issues in the case
to the jury, and a general verdict or finding upon all the issues, including
the issue or issues of fraud so raised, shall be sufficient." It was not the
purpose of the legislature by the enactment of this section "to change the
law of accord and satisfaction, and the rules governing the rescission of
contracts of settlements upon the grounds of fraud but the clear intention
was to avoid multiplicity of suits by authorizing the fraud issue to be
tried by the jury at the same time and in the same case involving the
original cause of action." Althoff v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1907) 204 Mo.
166, 102 S. W. 642, 643.
94. Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Mo. App. 1915) 178
S. W. 246; also (1919) 277 Mo. 399, 210 S. W. 37.
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for affirmative relief, the case, when appealed, will be reviewed
by the appellate court as a case in equity 5 The court of appeals
will examine the entire record as to the facts as well as to the
law and review the case upon its merits.98 Or, as generally said,
the case will be tried de novo.9 7 It will be examined or reviewed
in this manner even though the trial court availed itself of the
advice of a jury," as in any suit in equity the verdict of the
jury is not binding on the trial court., On the other hand, if the
case is not converted, it will be reviewed by the appellate court
as an action at law.100
Where a case is tried below by both parties on the theory that
it is one in equity or at law although actually the theory adopted
was wrong, the appellate court will not reverse the case on that
ground, 1 1 as the parties have waived the right to a jury trial
if the case was converted into a proceeding in equity, or to an
equity trial if the case remained one at law. 0 2 The reports re-
veal a number of cases involving equitable defenses and equitable
counterclaims where the appellant, detecting the error after the
trial, has sought unsuccessfully on appeal to obtain a reversal
on the ground that the case was tried on the wrong theory.
THE PREDOMINATING EQUITABLE DEFENSES
The predominating equitable defenses in Missouri seem to be:
estoppel in pais, laches, fraud, and mistake, although, as a gen-
eral rule, any right formerly cognizable in a court of equity can
95. Kerstner v. Vorweg (1895) 130 Mo. 196, 32 S. W. 298; Myers v.
Schuchmann (1904) 182 Mo. 159, 81 S. W. 618; Titus v. North Kansas
City Develop. Co. (1915) 264 Mo. 229, 174 S. W. 432; Schneider v.
Schneider (1920) 284 Mo. 314, 224 S. W. 1; Seaboard Nat'l Bank v.
Woesten (1897) 68 Mo. App. 137; Lawson v. Spencer (1899) 81 Mo. App.
169; Long v. Montgomery (Mo. App. 1929) 22 S. W. (2d) 206; Beckmann
v. Beckmann (Mo. App. 1932) 51 S. W. (2d) 136.
96. Brightwell v. McAfee (1913) 249 Mo. 562, 155 S. W. 820; Price &
Anderson v. Morrison (1921) 291 Mo. 249, 236 S. W. 297.
97. Liflander v. Bobbitt (Mo. 1937) 111 S. W. (2d) 72.
98. Weeke v. Senden (1873) 54 Mo. 129; Signaigo v. Signaigo (Mo.
1918) 205 S. W. 23.
99. Bronson v. Wanzer (1885) 86 Mo. 408; Hall v. Harris (1898) 145
Mo. 614, 47 S. W. 506; Northrip v. Burge (1914) 255 Mo. 641, 164 S. W.
584.
100. Marsden v. Nipp (1930) 325 Mo. 822, 30 S. W. (2d) 77.
101. Maget v. Bartlett Bros. Land & Loan Co. (1931) 226 Mo. App.
416, 41 S. W. (2d) 849; Kimberlin v. Roberts (1937) 341 Mo. 267, 107
S. W. (2d) 24.
102. Kostuba v. Miller (1897) 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W. 946; Kessner v.
Phillips (1905) 189 Mo. 515, 88 S. W. 66; Brooks v. Gaffin (1905) 192
Mo. 228, 90 S. W. 808.
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now be set up as an equitable defense to an action at law as a
bar to recovery or by way of counterclaim. 10 3 The defenses
enumerated, however, are of sufficient importance because of
their frequent use, or because of some peculiar rule, to merit
particular attention.
A plea of estoppel in pais,04 although often called equitable
estoppel, is not necessarily a matter of equitable jurisdiction,0 °
but is also available at law.106 It had its origin in equity but
was at an early date taken over by the common law courts and
applied in legal proceedings.07 Under some circumstances, how-
ever, full effect cannot be given to the estoppel by a mere judg-
ment at law. This situation arose in Ming v. Olster,08 where
the plaintiff instituted an action in ejectment. The defendant
set up in his answer a partition by parol under which he claimed
title to the land in question and asked the court to vest title in
him. A court of common law in Missouri could have found for
the defendant and against the plaintiff in the ejectment suit,
but it could not decree title where it would have been if a deed
had been executed by the parties at the time of the partition
of the land. Thus, where it becomes necessary to fill a gap in a
record title by a decree vesting title, estoppel in pais may be
set up by the defendant as the basis for an equitable counter-
claim on which to base a prayer for affirmative relief, although
the estoppel might have been set up merely as a bar to plain-
tiff's action. Consequently, when estoppel in pais is set up as
the basis for affirmative equitable relief in cases involving real
estate, it is classified as purely equitable. 0 9 This is true as a
103. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 49, sec. 30; Cook, supra note
20; Sachleben v. Heintze (1893) 117 Mo. 520, 24 S. W. 54; Kostuba v.
Miller (1897) 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W. 946.
104. To constitute estoppel in pais, there must be: an admission, state-
ment or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted and sued on;
an action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or
act; and an injury to such other party, resulting from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act. See 2
Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1644, see. 805.
105. Bank of Neelyville v. Lee (1916) 193 Mo. App. 537, 182 S. W.
1016; Ming v. Olster (1906) 195 Mo. 460, 92 S. IV. 898; Powell v. Bowen
(1919) 279 Mo. 280, 214 S. W. 142; McQuitty v. MeQuitty (1933) 332 Mo.
1057, 61 S. W. (2d) 342; Clauson v. Larman (Mo. App. 1919) 211 S. W.
912; Hamburger v. Hirsch (Mo. App. 1919) 212 S. W. 49. See also Pitman
v. 16 to 1 Mining Co. (1899) 78 Mo. App. 438.
106. See supra, note 105.
107. Hubbard v. Slavens (1909) 218 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104.
108. (1906) 195 Mo. 460, 92 S. IV. 898.
109. Schneider v. Schneider (1920) 284 Mo. 314, 224 S. W. 1.
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court of equity alone can vest the title in the defendant where
it rightfully belongs, if the estoppel is proved. Therefore, if the
defendant sets up estoppel in pais and also seeks affirmative re-
lief, the action is converted into a proceeding in equity.110 But,
on the other hand, if the defendant pleads facts constituting an
estoppel in pais without seeking affirmative relief, the plaintiff's
case remains one at law.", This is so whether the estoppel is
regarded as an equitable defense in bar or a legal defense. In
either instance, the plea simply goes to defeat the plaintiff's
cause of action; and there is no demand upon the court for any
relief peculiarly within the province of a court of equity.
Closely connected with estoppel in pais is the doctrine of
laches. In fact, it has been said that laches is but a manifesta-
tion of estoppel in pais, the latter being the genus and the former
a species." 2 But the defense of laches is available only where
equitable relief is sought by the plaintiff.113 In other words, it
cannot be used as a defense in bar or as the basis for an equitable
counterclaim"4 when the plaintiff's demand is one at law. It
should be noted, however, that estoppel in pais and laches are
not always clearly distinguished in the decisions. The rule has
often been laid down that laches not amounting to an estoppel is
a defense only to an equitable cause of action."
110. Bouton v. Pippin (1905) 192 Mo. 469, 91 S. W. 149; Withers v.
Kansas City Sub. Belt Ry. (1909) 226 Mo. 373, 126 S. W. 432; Newbrough
v. Moore (Mo. 1918) 202 S. W. 547; Bank of Neelyville v. Lee (1916) 193
Mo. App. 537, 182 S. W. 1016.
111. See cases cited supra, note 110.
112. Powell v. Bowen (1919) 279 Mo. 280, 214 S. W. 142; Boals v. Garden
City (Mo. App. 1932) 50 S. W. (2d) 179.
113. Kellogg v. Moore (1917) 271 Mo. 189, 196 S. W. 15, 16: "Laches is
peculiarly a defense to an equitable claim. We do not always stop to dis-
tinguish between laches and estoppel in pais * ** laches is purely a crea-
tion of equity, and is only to be invoked by the defendant in a case where
the plaintiff appeals to equity and seeks the enforcement of an equitable
right. Laches is an equitable doctrine which partakes in the nature of the
legal statutory limitation, but is not governed as to time by such statute.
It may be inequitable to permit the establishment of an equitable right
within a time less than the legal defense of the statutory limitations." Also
see Bevier v. Graves (Mo. 1919) 213 S. W. 74.
114. See Hecker v. Bleish (1928) 319 Mo. 148, 3 S. W. (2d) 1008. This
was an action in ejectment. The defendant filed a general denial, claiming
title to the property, and praying that the patent from the country to the
plaintiff be cancelled, and defendant decreed the owner. It was held that the
plaintiff's action was one at law, wherein he grounds his right to a legal
title. "Laches is peculiarly a defense to an equitable claim or cause of
action, and has no place as a defense to an action at law, or to an action
wherein plaintiff stands upon a legal claim of title." Hecker v. Bleish
(1928) 319 Mo. 148, 3 S. W. (2d) 1008, 1018.
115. Paxton v. Fix (Mo. 1916) 190 S. W. 328, and cases there cited.
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As has been heretofore indicated,""' fraud in the procurement
of a release could not formerly be set up as a defense in the
reply to an answer which pleaded such release as a bar to the
suit of the plaintiff. Prior to the enactment of the statute which
now expressly permits fraud to be set up in the reply, the release
could be impeached in an action at law when set up in bar to
plaintiff's claim if the fraud were of such a character as to
render the release void in the sense that the minds of the parties
never met.117 But if the fraud were only such as made the re-
lease voidable, the minds of the parties having actually met, it
was a complete bar to the plaintiff's suit, until set aside in an
equitable proceeding brought for that purpose." 8 The first situ-
ation arose in Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co.10 where the
plaintiff had been induced to sign a release when mentally in-
competent and unaware of what she had signed. Such a release
was held "void," and the facts making it so could be set up in
the reply and tried before a jury. But, in Ock v. Missouri,
Kansas & Texas Ry., 20 where the evidence showed that the
plaintiff knew what the release was, but was induced to sign it
on the assurance of defendant's agents and physicians that she
was not seriously injured, the release was held voidable and
hence could not be set up in the reply. In the first case, the law
treated the result of the fraud as a nullity, when it had been
ascertained, and passed on to judgment despite it. In the second
case, the result of the fraud not being a nullity, it could not be
passed over but was legal and binding until set aside in equity.
Consequently, the plaintiff was forced to resort to an indepen-
dent suit in equity or to include a count for cancellation or re-
scission in his action against the defendant.' 2'
It seems that the defendant could always, under the code, set
116. See supra, page 75.
117. Homuth v. Metropolitan St. Ry. (1895) 129 Mo. 629, 31 S. W. 903;
Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co. (1894) 46 Mo. App. 79, 27 S. W. 648;
Non-Royalty Shoe Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co. (Mo. App. 1915) 178 S. W. 246,
also (1919) 277 Mo. 399, 210 S. W. 37.
118. Och v. Missouri K & T. Ry. (1895) 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962; Han-
cock v. Blackwell (1897) 139 Mo. 440, 41 S. W. 205; Althoff v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1907) 204 Mo. 166, 102 S. W. 642.
119. (1894) 46 Mo. App. 79, 27 S. W. 648; also see supra, note 89.
120. (1895) 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962; also see supra, note 89.
121. Hancock v. Blackwell (1897) 139 Mo. 440, 41 S. W. 205; Ezo v. St.
Louis Smelting & Refining Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 87 S. W. (2d) 1051, and see
supra, note 90.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1939] EQUITABLE DEFENSES AT LAW IN MISSOURI 81
up fraud by way of answer to plaintiff's petition, regardless of
the nature of the fraud.12 2 Where the result of the fraud was
not a nullity, as discussed in the foregoing paragraph, the same
reasons existed as in the case of the reply with reference to
requiring the plaintiff to resort to a court of equity for relief.
It would therefore appear, even in the absence of the statute
permitting fraud in the procurement of a release, settlement, or
compromise of a cause of action to be set up in the reply, that
it should have been permissible.
1 23
Fraud may also be set up in the answer as the basis for an
equitable counterclaim to an action at law, and the entire case
will be thereby converted into a proceeding in equity.124 But the
122. Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co. (1894) 46 Mo. App. 79, 27 S. W.
648. And see Clough v. Holden (1893) 115 Mo. 336, 21 S. W. 1071, 37 Am.
St. Rep. 393, where fraud was pleaded as a defense in bar to an action on
a note. Also see infra, note 123, and Kitchen v. Cape Girardeau & State
Line R. R. (1875) 59 Mo. 514; Earl v. Hart (1886) 89 Mo. 263, 1 S. W. 238;
Routt v. Milner (1894) 57 Mo. App. 50.
123. Clark, op. cit. supra note 1, at 486, sec. 107.
124. Conrey v. Pratt (1913) 248 Mo. 576, 154 S. W. 749. This was a
suit on a note asking for judgment and foreclosure of a mortgage on the
land securing it. Defendant set up fraudulent misrepresentations in obtain-
ing the note and mortgage, and asked for their cancellation. The court
held that the case was converted into a proceeding in equity. Earl v. Hart
(1886) 89 Mo. 263, 1 S. W. 238. But see Wollums v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Ass'n (1931) 226 Mo. App. 647, 46 S. W. (2d) 259, that
even though the answer pleaded fraud in the procurement of an insurance
policy and prayed for a cancellation of the same, that the action was not
converted into one in equity and the court did not err in trying the case
before a jury. The court said: "It is only under very unusual circumstances
that a jury trial will be denied and defendant permitted to have the policy
cancelled after the happening of said contingency or event. State ex rel.
Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 306 Mo. 197, 214, 267 S. W. 832. The only circum-
stance that we have been able to find where an insurance company was
permitted in this state to maintain a suit in equity to cancel a policy under
such conditions, was the presence of an incontestable clause in the policy.
No action to enforce the policy had been instituted and by reason of the
presence of such clause the right of the company to raise the issue involved
in the suit for cancellation would expire at the expiration of the specified
period of time. It was held that the company could maintain cancellation.
New York Like Ins. Co. v. Cobb, 219 Mo. App. 609, 282 S. W. 494, a deci-
sion by the St. Louis Court of Appeals. However, the Springfield Court of
Appeals has disagreed with the St. Louis Court of Appeals in this respect
and holds that, under no circumstances, can a policy be cancelled after the
happening of the contingency or event upon which it is to become payable.
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel (Mo. App.) 33 S. W. (2d) 424. The
Springfield Court of Appeals certified the last mentioned case to the Su-
preme Court, as being in conflict with the Cobb Case, and the Supreme
Court held that there must be a jury trial where the beneficiary sues.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 42 S. W. (2d) 584. The decision in those
cases agreeing with the decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the
Cobb Case are based upon the ground that the only remedy the insurance
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decisions are not clear whether an equitable counterclaim may
be set up in the reply, although the apparent import of Hancock
v. Blackwel1125 is to that effect. This case involved an action for
damages alleged to have been caused by slander. The defendant
denied generally the allegations of the plaintiff's petition and
set up a written agreement or release by way of bar. The plain-
tiff filed a reply in which she admitted signing the release and
alleged that it had been obtained by fraud but sought no affirma-
tive equitable relief. A motion was filed by the defendant to
strike out that portion of the plaintiff's reply which set up the
alleged fraud because "said reply attempts to raise issues triable
solely in a court of equity." 128 The trial court's action in over-
ruling this motion was reversed on appeal. The opinion of the
court is clarified by the opinion in the second appeal,127 where
the dissenting judge stated that the first appeal did not decide
that the plaintiff could not in a reply invoke the equitable relief
she afterwards sought by a separate count in her petition, but
that "if the reply had been in proper shape, in effect a bill in
equity praying a rescission of the contract, it would have been
entirely valid under our code system of pleading."'128
No valid reason is conceivable why fraud may not be made
the basis for affirmative relief, since other equitable defenses
may be coupled with a prayer for such relief in the reply. The
scarcity of decisions on this phase of equitable defenses is per-
haps accounted for by the fact that the plaintiff would gener-
ally prefer to have the question of fraud tried by a jury under
section 782 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (1929), rather
than have the action converted into a proceeding in equity
through the interposition of an equitable counterclaim where a
more convincing degree of proof would be required in order to
prove his case.12 9
company has, under such circumstances, is a suit in equity to cancel the
policy." Wollums v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n (1931) 226
Mo. App. 647, 46 S. W. (2d) 259, 262, 263. See also, Lilly v. Washington
Fidelity Nat'l Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 656.
125. (1897) 139 Mo. 440, 41 S. W. 205; for second appeal of same case,
see Courtney v. Blackwell (1899) 150 Mo. 245, 51 S. W. 668, noting espe-
cially separate opinion of Marshall, J., at page 278, and also dissent of
Valliant, J., at page 278.
126. Hancock v. Blackwell (1897) 139 Mo. 440, 41 S. W. 205, 206.
127. Courtney v. Blackwell (1899) 150 Mo. 245, 51 S. W. 668.
128. Courtney v. Blackwell (1899) 150 Mo. 245, 51 S. W. 668, 677.
129. Girard v. St. Louis Car-Wheel Co. (1894) 46 Mo. App. 79, 27 S. W.
648.
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The power of a court of equity to relieve against the conse-
quence of mistake has long been established beyond doubt. 30
Under the code such relief can be sought by answer.' 3' Mistake
of fact may, therefore, be set up as an equitable counterclaim
by the defendant to an action at law, and where this is done,
plaintiff's legal action is converted into one in equity. 32 As we
have previously seen, it is a general rule under the Missouri
code, that the defendant may either set up an equitable defense
in bar or as a counterclaim, but, where the plaintiff's case is
based on a written instrument, the equitable defense of mistake
of fact cannot be pleaded in bar. 33 Unless affirmative relief is
sought, the defense in bar amounts to an attempt to vary the
terms of a written contract by parol evidence. Undoubtedly,
under a liberal construction of the code, mistake should be al-
lowed as an equitable defense going to show that the plaintiff
ought not recover. And so far as oral agreements are con-
cerned, the objection to permitting mistake as an equitable de-
fense in bar obviously is not applicable.
LEGAL ACTIONS IN WHICH EQUITABLE DEFENSES
PREDOMINATE
Pomeroy states that the actions to recover the possession of
land (ejectment and actions analogous to it) are the ones in
which the equitable defense is the most frequently used, al-
though, of course, it assumes a great variety of shapes.134 This
statement is equally true with respect to the use of equitable
defenses to actions at law in Missouri. Consequently, in the light
of the apparent importance of such defenses in actions regard-
ing real estate, this phase deserves some specific consideration.
While ejectment is an action at law, yet if the answer sets
up an equitable defense and seeks affirmative relief based there-
on, the action is converted into a proceeding in equity.1 35 Failure
130. Mastin v. Halley (1875) 61 Mo. 196; Federal Land Bank v. Mc-
Colgan (1933) 332 Mo. 860, 59 S. W. (2d) 1052; Goodin Mercantile Co. v.
Organ (Mo. App. 1916) 186 S. W. 589; Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossmann (1916)
196 Mo. App. 78, 190 S. W. 636.
131. Engler v. Knoblaugh (1908) 131 Mo. App. 481, 110 S. W. 16.
132. Joyce v. Murnaghan (1885) 17 Mo. App. 11.
133. Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossmann (1916) 196 Mo. App. 78, 190 S. W. 636.
Also see Farmers' Bank v. Redman (Mo. App. 1929) 24 S. W. (2d) 235.
134. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 22, at 51, sec. 32.
135. McCollum v. Boughton (1896) 132 Mo. 601, 30 S. W. 1028, 35
L. R. A. 480; Swon v. Stevens (1908) 143 Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270; Dunn v.
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to seek such relief leaves the case one at law.13 6 From the fore-
going it is apparent that all the general rules applicable to equi-
table defenses and equitable counterclaims are applicable to
ejectment suits.
An equitable defense is not possible in cases of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer. Exclusive jurisdiction over these matters
is vested in the justice of the peace courts 37 which have no
equitable jurisdiction138 Nor may an equitable defense be inter-
posed on the transfer of such a case to the circuit court as no
defense can be made there which could not have been made be-
fore the justice of peace. 39 Consequently, a defendant, wishing
to rely on an equitable defense in an action of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer must bring an original suit in a court of
equity.
The contention has been constantly made that actions to quiet
title are of themselves equitable. Sometimes the action is one
at law, that is to say, a proceeding brought under the statute;
and sometimes it is a proceeding in equity. The scope of the
plaintiff's pleadings is the decisive factor. 40 It is an action at
law if the plaintiff merely declares in the terms of the statute ;141
McCoy (1899) 150 Mo. 548, 52 S. W. 21; Shaffer v. Detie (1905) 191 Mo.
377, 90 S. W. 131; Bouton v. Pippin (1905) 192 Mo. 469, 91 S. W. 149;
Tetley v. McElmurry (1907) 201 Mo. 382, 100 S. W. 37; Hubbard v. Slavens(1909) 218 Mo. 598, 117 S. W. 1104; Betzler & Clark v. James (1910) 227
Mo. 375, 126 S. W. 1007; Titus v. North Kansas City Develop. Co. (1915)
264 Mo. 229, 174 S. W. 432; Myers v. Schuchmann (1904) 182 Mo. App.
159, 81 S. W. 618.
136. Swope v. Weller (1894) 119 Mo. 556, 25 S. W. 204; McCollum v.
Boughton (1896) 132 Mo. 601, 34 S. W. 480; Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899)
153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515.
137. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 2449; also see McQuoid v. Lamb (1885) 19
Mo. App. 153.
138. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2168, provides: "No justice of the peace shall
have jurisdiction * * * of any strictly equitable proceedings." See Small v.
Speece (1908) 131 Mo. App. 513, 110 S. W. 7; Peycke v. Sandstone Co.(1915) 195 Mo. App. 417, 191 S. W. 1088; Boehme v. Roth (Mo. App. 1926)
280 S. W. 730.
139. Gruenewald v. Schaales (1885) 17 Mo. App. 324; State ex rel.
Jackly v. Taylor (1922) 210 Mo. App. 195, 242 S. W. 997.
140. Doe Run Lead Co. v. Maynard (1924) 283 Mo. 646, 223 S. W. 690.
See also: Minor v. Burton (1910) 228 Mo. 558, 128 S. W. 964; Babcock v.
Rieger (1933) 332 Mo. 528, 58 S. W. (2d) 722; Slagle v. Callaway (1933)
333 Mo. 1055, 64 S. W. (2d) 923, 90 A. L. R. 1366; Stafford v. Shinabarger
(1935) 336 Mo. 856, 81 S. W. (2d) 626; Rains v. Moulder (1936) 338 Mo.
275, 90 S. W. (2d) 81; Kimberlin v. Roberts (1937) 341 Mo. 267, 107 S. W.
(2d) 24.
141. Mendenhall v. Pearce (1929) 323 Mo. 964, 20 S. W. (2d) 670;
Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon (1934) 334 Mo. 817, 68 S. W. (2d) 814.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1939] EQUITABLE DEFENSES AT LAW IN MISSOURI 85
but where he does not limit the allegations of his petition to the
language of the statute but goes on and sets up matters of equi-
table cognizance, it is a proceeding in equity.142 In other words,
the action to quiet title, if going beyond the words of the statute
and setting up equities, is an action in equity. Where the action
is one at law, that is, based solely on the statute, the interposi-
tion by the defendant of an equitable defense with a prayer for
affirmative relief, converts the case into one in equity. 43 With-
out such a prayer, the case remains one at law. 44
A partition proceeding is but an ordinary civil action in this
state14 7 and is usually based on statute. 46 Besides statutory
partition,147 however, there is also what is referred to as equitable
partition,148 which deals with equitable estates and interests. 49
Obviously, therefore, this latter type is available where equitable
interests in land are to be partitioned. 150 In other words, equity
142. Newbrough v. Moore (1918) 202 S. WV. 547; Schneider v. Schneider
(1920) 284 Mo. 314, 224 S. W. 1; Ebbs v. Neff (1930) 325 Mo. 1182, 30
S. W. (2d) 616; Bevier v. Graves (Mo. 1919) 213 S. W. 74; Kimberlin v.
Roberts (1937) 341 Mo. 267, 107 S. W. (2d) 24.
143. Koehler v. Rowland (1918) 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217; Jacobs v.
Waldron (1927) 317 Mo. 1133, 298 S. W. 773; Ebbs v. Neff (1930) 325 Mo.
1182, 30 S. W. (2d) 616; Wolfersberger v. Hoppenjon (1934) 334 Mo. 817,
68 S. W. (2d) 814; Dinkelman v. Hovekamp (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 681.
144. Turner v. Hine (1923) 297 Mo. 153, 248 S. W. 933.
145. Green v. Walker (1899) 99 Mo. 68, 12 S. W. 353; Benoist v. Thomas
(1894) 121 Mo. 660, 27 S. W. 609; Moore v. Mansfield (Mo. 1926) 286
S. W. 353.
146. R. S. Mo. (1929) c. 7, art. 11.
147. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 1545, 1546; also see Flynn v. McNeely (Mo.
1915) 178 S. W. 69.
148. Flynn v. McNeely (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 69; Martin v. Martin
(1913) 250 Mo. 539, 157 S. W. 575. See also Donaldson v. Allen (1908) 213
Mo. 293, 111 S. W. 1128, 1130: "Equitable features are every day incidents
of partition suits; for example: The allowance of payments made by one
co-tenant on account of the common property, as in the satisfaction of taxes,
liens, and the like; compelling a co-tenant who has absorbed the common
rents to account; adding, to his pro-rata share of the property, the expense
and outlay of one co-tenant in bettering the common property, by erecting
valuable improvements thereon in good faith; in equalizing advancements;
and in divesting title, decreeing a trust, or establishing title as a step
incident to partition. (Cases cited.) That such incidents are usually met
in partition suits is common knowledge of the bench and bar. It is within
bounds to say that much the greater number of such suits are equitable
in their nature."
149. Coffman v. Gates (1909) 142 Mo. App. 648, 121 S. W. 1078.
150. Martin v. Martin (1913) 250 Mo. 539, 157 S. W. 575, 577: "That
equitable interests in land may be partitioned in an appropriate proceeding
for that purpose has been long settled in this state. While such a proceeding
is called an equitable one in distinction from the action at law prescribed
by the statute in such cases, it is also settled that the practice will be regu-
lated by the statutory provisions so far as applicable. See also Reed v.
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will entertain a bill to partition an equitable estate."1 In all
partition suits, the circuit court is vested with the jurisdiction
and the power of a court of chancery, even though the procedure
is partly regulated by statute.5 2
The partition act is, of course, independent of the code in all
matters where special provision has been made.5 3 Consequently,
in such other matters, the provisions of the general code of pro-
cedure will naturally apply.' 54
Where the partition suit is based upon the statute, it is a pro-
ceeding at law;315 or, stated in another manner, if no equitable
features are stated in the pleadings, it is a legal or statutory
action. 5 6 But even such a legal action is converted into a pro-
ceeding in equity,15 7 or into an action for equitable partition, as
it is sometimes called,1 8 through the filing of an answer setting
forth an equitable defense coupled with a prayer for affirmative
relief. Thus, in Rowley v. Rowley 59 the plaintiff instituted the
statutory action for partition; and the defendants, in their an-
swer, alleged the existence of a mistake in the description of the
land in the conveyance under which the plaintiff claimed title
and asked the court to correct such description and to deter-
Robertson (1870) 45 Mo. 580; Schowe v. Xallmeyer (1929) 323 Mo. 899,
20 S. W. (2d) 26.
151. James v. Groff (1900) 157 Mo. 402, 57 S. W. 1081; Armor v. Jester
(1913) 253 Mo. 480, 161 S. W. 839.
152. Flynn v. McNeely (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 69; Devoto v. Devoto
(1930) 326 Mo. 511, 31 S. W. (2d) 805.
153. Cochran v. Thomas (1895) 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W. 6; note also Devoto
v. Devoto (1930) 326 Mo. 511, 31 S. W. (2d) 805.
154. Bock v. Whelan (Mo. 1930) 30 S. W. (2d) 607.
155. Martin v. Martin (1913) 250 Mo. 539, 157 S. W. 575; Watson v.
Priest (1880) 9 Mo. App. 263; and see Sawyer v. French (1921) 290 Mo.
374, 235 S. W. 126, 129, in which the court held: "The pleadings in this
case are at law, no equitable features are alleged either in the petition or
the answer, and no equitable relief is prayed for. The issues therefore
are strictly legal, and, the case having been tried by the court sitting as ajury, we are bound by the decision of the lower court on the facts, and
cannot consider the evidence in the case de novo."
156. Flynn v. McNeely (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 69; Sawyer v. French (1921)
290 Mo. 374, 235 S. W. 126; McQuitty v. McQuitty (1933) 332 Mo. 1057,
61 S. W. (2d) 342. Also see Ferrell v. Ferrell (1913) 253 Mo. 167, 161
S. W. 719.
157. Moore v. Mansfield (Mo. 1926) 286 S. W. 353; Sawyer v. French
(1921) 290 Mo. 374, 235 S. W. 126; McQuitty v. McQuitty (1933) 332 Mo.
1057, 61 S. W. (2d) 342. Also see Ferrell v. Ferrell (1913) 253 Mo. 167,
161 S. W. 719.
158. Flynn v. McNeely (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 69; Rowley v. Rowley (Mo.
1917) 197 S. W. 152; Hiler v. Cox (1908) 210 Mo. 696, 109 S. W. 679.
159. (Mo. 1917) 197 S. W. 152.
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mine and decree the title. Thereupon the action became one in
equity. This view is in consonance with the general rule previ-
ously discussed regarding the effect of pleading an equitable
defense coupled with a prayer for affirmative relief in the an-
swer.160 As a result, where the defendant's answer sets up no
ground for equitable relief, it is error for the court to award
such relief.Y61 The action remains one at law. Consequently,
whether an action for partition based on the statute is converted
into a proceeding in equity is important chiefly as an element
in determining relief to be awarded. The question, so important
in most other actions, as to whether the parties are entitled to
a jury trial is apparently of no consequence here. At one time
the parties were held to be entitled to have certain issues arising
in a partition suit tried by a jury ;162 but the rule now appears
to be otherwise, although undoubtedly the court may call a jury
to its aid.'6'
CONCLUSION
To summarize, it may be said, as a general rule, that any
matter cognizable in a court of equity in 1849 may now be s~t
up as a defense to a legal action. Such a defense may either be
set up simply as matter in bar to plaintiff's action, or it may be
interposed as the basis for affirmative equitable relief. In the
first instance, the case remains one at law, triable with all the
incidents of that type of case, while in the latter instance, the
case is converted into one in equity and tried as a proceeding
in equity. There are, however, exceptions to these general prin-
ciples as we have seen.
Although there has not been a complete blending of law and
equity, the rules of law now applied by the courts with reference
to equitable defenses, either in bar or coupled with a prayer for
affirmative relief, generally attain practical results. Perhaps in
a few instances the adoption of a more liberal view would be
160. See supra, page 67.
161. Moore v. Mansfield (Mo. 1926) 286 S. W. 353.
162. Benoist v. Thomas (1894) 121 Mo. 660, 27 S. W. 609.
163. Flynn v. McNeely (Mo. 1915) 178 S. W. 69, 71: "I do not concur
in the view that any trial judge sits as a jury in a statutory proceeding in
partition. True it is that these proceedings are not denominated equitable,
unless equities are invoked. Neither are they legal in the sense of requiring
a jury upon demand. They are statutory, and in a sense a species of cases
in a class to themselves. They are triable by the court without the inter-
vention of a jury whatever may be the issues made by the pleadings."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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more consonant with the purpose of the code. Especially is this
true with the present rule which denies the defendant the right
to set up mistake of fact as a bar to an action on a written
instrument on the ground that it would amount to an attempt
to vary its terms by parol evidence. No other reason supports
the present rule. It has no better right to continued existence
than did the former rule which prohibited the setting up of
fraud in the reply.
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